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Introduction to MCA Issue, 
“Systemic Cyber Defense”1 
Chris C. Demchak, Issue Editor2 
Benjamin Schechter, Assistant Editor3 
The study of cybersecurity is fractured by differing theories, concepts, and perspectives on 
behaviors and events, and the consequences are fractured recommendations and policies. What is 
critically needed now is a systemic picture of the emerging world and the longer-term security 
implications for westernized democracies. This issue constitutes the proceedings from a meeting 
of senior national and international subject matter experts from academia, industry, and 
government focused across two days of deliberations on closing the circle from broad challenges 
to implementing solutions.  On May 1st and 2nd, 2018, the U.S. Naval War College’s Center for 
Cyber Conflict Studies4 hosted its 6th Biennial Cyber Workshop entitled": Integrating
Economics, Information, Innovation, and Operationalization.”  The meeting’s objective was 
to integrate disparate themes, data, and arguments about cybersecurity. To ensure a 
comprehensive, international perspective on what should be done, the discussion was co-
sponsored by the European School of Management and Technology’s Digital Society 
Institute, and participants were personally invited from allied national security and academic 
institutions.  
Assembled in this issue are the written contributions to the workshop. The group of 
experts drew from themes of systemic economic maladaptation and losses, declining 
western global innovation dominance, and a diminishing US-led international civil society into 
implications for militaries tasked with defending the Nation and allies in a deeply cybered, post-
western world.  
1 The views and ideas expressed here are the authors alone and do not represent those of the U.S. Government, 
the Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, or U.S. Naval War College. 
2 Dr. Chris C. Demchak is the RDML Grace M. Hopper Chair of Cyber Security in the Strategic and Operational 
Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College. 
3 Mr. Benjamin Schechter is a Research Associate in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the 
U.S. Naval War College. 
4 As of this publication, Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (C3S) has transitioned into the Cyber and Innovation 
Policy Institute (CIPI).  The change builds on this and prior work by C3S in an expanded and strengthened 
community of cyber researchers at the U.S. Naval War College.
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Key conclusions from the meeting emphasized the need for new models of defense and 
economic thinking to prepare the defense and commercial communities for the reality of an 
antagonistic, overwhelmingly larger, cybered authoritarian world. The following captures the main 
observations. 
First, without the creation of new models, recognizing the criticality of private sector 
participation in defense, states will continue to be at risk. There is currently no narrative or 
encouragement for private sector leaders to acknowledge the systemic threats their organizations 
face, let alone the existential threats to their whole society. The lack of an inclusive national digital 
policy is the result of twenty years of stagnation; complacency about the security of a shoddily 
constructed internet allowed everything to be connected without regard to possible deleterious 
consequences. In contrast, major adversaries are today engaged in a great deal of digital policy 
innovation, domestic regulatory experimentation, and international IT market shaping to advance 
their economies, strengthen their international leverage, and prepare the future cyber-physical 
battlefield to their advantage. In democratic civil societies, however, segmentation of 
governmental cyber defense efforts and fragmentation of government support for systemic 
innovations have been allowed to happen without foresight and direction. The results are national 
digital economic strategies in that do not incorporate defense concepts or consider them as critical 
as product development or market growth for national well-being and security.  Neither incentives 
nor regulations have ensured secure, interrogatable designs and algorithmic transparency as 
baseline production requirements for current and future IT systems. 
Second, the critical widespread national investments in secure technologies as a public 
good have been allowed to wither under a misplaced presumption that the commercial market 
innovation will provide adequate investments to meet both private and public systemic needs. 
System-wide disaster resilience and recovery has only been shallowly discussed by the 
government and in the private sector, with limited requirements for backups and only vague 
evidence of effective resilience. There is an assumption that outside sources will provide 
mitigation and recovery irrespective of the scale of the disruption. Furthermore, the effects of 
weakened alliance systems and anti-globalization politics on the ability of westernized democratic 
states to organize and mobilize collective resource for cyber defenses in the future are not 
adequately studied. 
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Third, in contrast, the major rising adversary – China – has been routinely mischaracterized 
by both the defense and commercial sectors. Much can be learned from adversaries if one perceives 
them accurately. China is a strategic opportunist, not fundamentally hostile as yet. Its extraordinary 
economic successes are in part due to western democracies’ unwillingness to enforce WTO 
requirements or punish bad behaviors across cyberspace.  The economic and ultimately defense 
blindness of these democracies is largely due to their own shared, flawed set of assumptions that 
the global international economic systems would inevitably drive China to open its markets and 
comply with international norms and laws. These assumptions have not played out, as China’s 
autocratic political system naturally links the government with its IT capital goods industry.  The 
resulting cooperation in the exploitation of international markets creates a coherent and winning 
combination of resources, strategic goals, coordinated large-scale efforts, and providing resilience 
(when needed) as a formidable, large scale, nearly ubiquitous economic and security challenge 
democratic states. China’s IT success over twenty years today allows the Chinese Communist 
Party to impose its economic weight nearly worldwide to achieve both economic and political 
benefits as a rising global cyber power. While China’s ability to preserve the economic gains and 
assure future freedom of international maneuver and influence rises, westernized states are still 
unable to make individual or like-minded collective economic defense strategies to ensure their 
societies survive well in a coming world of economic and political systems dominated by “Chinese 
characteristics.” 
Fourth, similar conceptual, narrative, and modeling struggles with integration into the 
whole-of-society national security for a deeply cybered world exist for westernized defense 
structures and participants. Several of the discussion’s recommendations included new structures 
for the westernized democracies, finally shedding the legacy Cold War thinking to adapt to a 
cybered, hostile world.  Especially critical are new institutional forms across defense, other public 
sector entities, and the private sector that operationally combine the magnitude of the IT talent, 
demographic weight, and inter-organizational joint operations experience of the 900 million-plus 
consolidated democratic civil societies.  Militaries will be playing critical roles in the cybered 
conflicts of the future, but they will need to have constructed more flexible structures and strategies 
for allied, coordinated, and yet degraded, decomposable operations.  National defense strategies 
will need to be aligned with national economic defense strategies.  New forms of reserves, national 
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service, and integration with the private sector will need to be developed, gamed, implemented, 
and adaptively abandoned or evolved as major new basic IT investments produce advances to help 
defense overmatch particularly Chinese massive public support to its rising IT dominance.  
Military units should less and less mirror the standing massed forces of the Cold War, and yet be 
able to mass talent, persistence, and effects as needed for the whole-of-nation defense. Ultimately 
for militaries, cyberspace and cybered fleet or unified command analogies will have to be 
rethought to apply lessons learned from the history of minority states.  For them, systemically 
combining operationally and across sectors was the only way to successfully resist aggressive 
larger states over the longer term; the challenge is the same in the cybered and hostile world. 
This journal issue addresses these and other points in a variety of approaches. Together 
these pieces contribute to cyber security mid-level theory in offering the elements of broader 
systemic thinking to be used in research and, ultimately, in the development of new models and 
theories. To be clear, new model and theories are needed urgently for westernized democracies to 
adapt well enough to defend their economic well-being and room for maneuver for decades to 
come. The final objective is for these nations to buy time in the near term and adapt for the longer 
term, assuring they will be collectively thriving democratic civil societies in a hundred years 
despite being a minority of states in the larger emerging, adversarial, and cyber authoritarian world. 
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